|
Introduction The Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) is a structure that was set up in the provinces of the South in March 2006. It is composed of 141 members, and is led by a restricted body which comprises the President, nine Vice-presidents as well as a General-Secretary. Barely three months following its creation, CORCAS met in an extraordinary session (from 25 to 27 June, 2006 in Rabat) so as to discuss, in plenary sessions and in commissions, the Autonomy Project that concerns the Sahara Region. Ever since then, CORCAS found itself to be an integral, and privileged, part in the process of the Autonomy Project under three fronts: 1) as an "advisor" to the King on Sahrawi Affairs; 3) for having engaged in debate on this project, and 3) because it is immediately concerned by the whole affair, as long as the Project is devoted to the Sahrawi populations to be found in the camps of Tindouf. It must ; however, be recalled that this Project (which is presented as a Moroccan Initiative for the settlement of the Sahara conflict within the framework of an autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty) is part and parcel of the State foreign policy, one that principally derives at the level of conception and elaboration from Royal power (notably in virtue of Articles 19 ad 31 of the Moroccan Constitution), and from the ministry of Foreign Affairs which plays, indeed, an instrumental role at the level of implementation. This is to say that the role of CORCAS ought to fit in within this canvas, and come in therefore to reinforce this combined policy, be it at the level of heed and sensitization at the internal plane; or of vigilance and motivation at the international level. In other words, to use economic jargon, CORCAS could bring in some sort of value-added to the Sahara affair by carrying out a two-fold mission, which is shouldered both at the internal plane (I) and the international plane (II). I. the role of corcas at the internal level The running of affairs at the level of the Sahara does not forcibly abide by the rules and practices that have been in evidence in the northern Regions of the country, which have for a long time now been settled and broken off from public matters. This in no way suggests that the Sahara Region has not taken stock of administrative techniques and modalities. On the contrary, ever since its reunion with the mother country (1975), it has been involved in this process. However, a thirty year period, which was marked by some great flexibility for the sake of taking into account local specificities, cannot constitute any historical depth susceptible of providing a safety-valve, as it were, that would help to carry out things for the better. It is for this reason that it rests with CORCAS to further involve itself, and more closely so, side by side with the local populations, to be at their beck and call, and to get down to the task of training the people who will be called upon to assume responsibilities at the local plane. This is to say that CORCAS is called upon to promote, on the one hand, a community-based policy and to secure the training of the local elites, on the other. A. the promotion of a community-based policy What do we understand by a community-based policy? Some define it as "system of social attention and alertness, destined to improve the quality of life" within a determinate space, oftentimes urban. More simply put, one could define it as the situation of being close to the people in order to pin down their expectations, as well as their needs and, by the same token, to be reactive to the extent of their priorities and urgent needs. As the representatives of different Sahrawi fractions, the members of CORCAS could well perform these tasks by seeking information from the inhabitants, and taking note of their grievances, in order to relay these to such intermediary bodies as commissions and work groups, and later to the supreme authority-the Sovereign. The impact of this social wariness through this community-based policy translates in promoting as well as reinforcing this policy of solidarity in such a way as to encourage reconciliation, and to ban the psychological frontiers inherent to ideologico-tribal belonging in the narrow sense of the term. An approach such as this will not fail to have an impact on participative democracy, as well as on local governance and, by the same token, make the inhabitants receptive to and ready for the experience of autonomy in the Sahara region. This community-based policy; however, ought not to be conceived of in a vacuum; it has to be instrumentalized, that is, provided with or having a certain operationality in order to lead the Sahrawi citizens to cooperate. To this end, this community-based policy out to be both attractive and dynamic: Attractive, that is, it must put in place an open framework that allows all types of sensibilities to express themselves, including that part of Sahrawis who rejoined Morocco after quite a long "wondering", as it were, but who cannot easily break away from under the spell of certain received ideas, or certain manners of reasoning. What matters most essentially is that they have accepted to come back to the mother land in order to envision a future which, for lack of being immediately bright, is at least promising; the members of CORCAS have to plan for the future with a clear orientation as well as an immovable confidence, that is, they have to foster and nourish hope; Dynamic, in the sense that this community-based policy has to take root in a structured vision that aims at progressively integrating the different spaces, from the smallest to the widest, wherein men and women are grouped, eventually passing through intermediary spaces, the ultimate objective being to come to a relation of affinity; nay, of symbiosis, between the inhabitants and the locally elected members, through transparent liaison channels and facile meeting opportunities and, if need be, through mobilization.
All that has been said so far is a necessary condition, no doubt, but it does not suffice, though. In fact, in order to be brought to fruition, this community-based policy requires that it be pursued by a class that is very much aware of the stakes involved in this autonomy, that is, by an elite that ought to be trained so that it could, on the spur of the moment, come in as a reinforcement for the current elite and ultimately take over. B. the training of local elites It is commonly admitted nowadays that, among the human institutions that evolve slowly, one precisely counts the governance and training of elites. With respect to the latter, the fact is that this inertia could perhaps appear, first of all, as an inconvenience. In light of yet another scale of reading, which may be accused of being conservative, such inertia could turn out to be an asset rather, in so far as it testifies to a certain stability of institutions, which in general constitutes a major point of reference, as well as a condition of legitimacy for the exercise of power. Some qualifications are in order here, however. Should this slowness in the renewal of the local elites constitute stability in the short and medium terms, it could, in the long term, become a real inconvenience, even a threat, owing to at least three factors: First, because the mutations that are taking place at the international and national planes (political and economic governance, the advent of interdependence and of globalization, etc.) hold the germs of a dysfunction; nay, a certain sclerosis, should the modes of management at the local plane prove to be incapable of keeping up with the rhythms of this evolution; Then, because this slowness could favor a tendency on the part of the present elites to take delight in a comfort that could easily degenerate into a bureaucracy; Finally, because it could eventually create social outcasts, and therefore malcontents. As Talleyrand would have it, "the malcontents are the poor ones that think." In other terms, a slowness of this kind could trigger off tensions, and even hatred within the social fabric.
What this implies is that in the area of training elites, the task of CORCAS is burdensome and quite difficult; it does not only have to secure on-the-job training through, at best, cycles of training that are provided for local officials by the Ministry of Interior. It has also, and above all, to supply and develop, in cooperation with the other regions of the north of Morocco; or even with foreign countries that have experience in this area, the structures of reception as well as the institutions (universities, centers, institutes, etc.) considered to offer some basic theoretical training. Only these conditions will be such as to create what we call today in the developed world "public institutional engineering;" that is, the will and capacity to put in place, by means of conceptual schemas, a type of administrative management, or even "culture" that are on the same wavelengths as the objectives that society sets for itself. This amounts to saying that, in securing the reinvigoration and training of elites, one will not fail to equip, in the last instance, the administration with a management which will be such as to respond, both efficiently and effectively, to the challenges of society in general, and of administrative and political direction, in particular. CORCAS could equally draw inspiration from certain foreign experiences that have shown evidence of a certain innovation on matters pertaining to the involvement of potentials and competences that issue from different horizons of the management system of public matters. Such is the case, for instance, of certain cities in Brazil, where the officials of local collectivities regularly meet with private-sector staff as well as civil society militants in order to address and debate a certain number of problems of a local nature. The training of elites could also revolve around research and research training, as well as on the elaboration of programs such as "young innovative companies," as is the case in a certain number of emerging countries such as Brazil, India and China, which grant a place of precedence to technological innovation, of which the environment, for instance, is one part. II. the role of corcas on the international level It would not be unnecessary to recall here that CORCAS has been appointed by the King so that it should give him authorized advice and opinion on everything that bears upon the Sahara issue. In view of this fact, CORCAS has, at the international plane, a legitimacy that allows this structure (President, Vice-presidents, Secretary-general, or a mandated group), and above all to its president, to act as a special envoy, a sort of unparalleled itinerant in charge of defending the national cause, and presenting the autonomy Initiative as a credible Project. On yet another plane, it is the task of representing Sahrawis - be they inside or outside the State frontiers--that CORCAS is called upon to fulfill. A. the preservation of territorial integrity CORCAS represents the human beings who would be most threatened in their existence as Moroccans, should the unity of the territory not be safeguarded. Besides, the fact that the enemies of the territorial integrity of Morocco grant credibility only to "the internationally recognized frontiers" reinforces this existential precariousness, and exacerbates at the same time - and here is a very positive point-the feeling of national belonging, as well as the unshakeable will and determination to perpetuate the latter. Indeed, the idea of unity and of national belonging, which are vehemently defended by CORCAS, moves then in the direction of preserving the territorial integrity of the Kingdom. It brings guarantees to the autonomy Project, and endows it with a consistency that has no parallel other than the desire that the Sahrawis have for benefitting from a large autonomy, considering the specificity of their local realities in relation to other Regions. It is then as such that the Moroccan Initiative relative to the autonomy Statute will be presented on the international scene, through different meetings and encounters with foreign interlocutors, should they be actors in governmental spheres (Heads of States, Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs ministers, diplomats), or elected representatives (Parliaments, Senates, Presidents of Regions, etc.); or belong to civil society or the world of the press. To these different interlocutors, this Initiative will not fail to come under two aspects, fundamental ones for that. First, as a coherent Project, because it seeks to yoke together a national requirement (unity and territorial integrity) and a regional requirement (an autonomy as large as possible), to which one has to add the fact that the Project in question is one that has not been defended by some guardian authority of sorts, but by those immediately concerned themselves. Also, because it is a question of a pragmatic Project, considering, on the one hand, the terms of the solution that it proposes towards overcoming the crisis and; therefore, settling a dispute that has by now become almost like a school case, especially at the level of international Organizations, owing its longevity and complexity, above all. And, on the other hand, considering the will and determination to ban all sorts of exclusion by giving the hand, for the sake of bringing this project to fruition, to all the Sahrawis, including those found to be under the authority of the Polisario. Thus, in its ardent desire to defend the principle of territorial integrity, CORCAS should not find much difficulty with the representatives of other States, so long as it is true that it is a question of an almost sacred principle. Yet, despite the somewhat intrinsic character of the latter, one should not expect that it be sufficient to pronounce and announce the principle for it to automatically lead to the effects sought out; that is, an automatic adhesion and support. Some perseverance is mandatory, and so is a follow-up that is coupled with some lobbying capable enough to lead States to stand out and take a favorable position and, later, to make it such as to preserve and fructify the positive gestures and affinities. In acting so, CORCAS will bring in not only extra support, as well as complementarity to the different moves of the State in connection with this question, but will also serve as a link with the Moroccan authorities in charge of foreign policy, be it at the level of the central administration or foreign services (diplomatic Missions), for which the Sahara dossier constitutes but one of a multiplicity of daily preoccupations. It is true that for each one it is a principal dossier, but it remains for CORCAS, at least at the external plane, a predominant; nay, a unique one. This amounts to saying that this Council ought to show evidence of a more intense activity at the international plane; that is, as much as, if not more than, traditional diplomacy, for it must be borne in mind that as a form of ad hoc diplomacy, CORCAS has more flexibility at the level of its means and the deployment of its actions. It remains to recall and specify here that CORCAS is not answerable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, neither is it so to the Prime Minster. It submits its reports directly to the Sovereign (guarantor, pursuant to Article 19 of the Constitution, of the territorial integrity of the Kingdom), who attends to coordinating, along with his immediate entourage and therefore his close collaborators (Advisors, the Army, intelligence services...), the actions of the Minster of Foreign Affairs, who remains to be the principal tool for the King at the level of foreign policy. Of course, all of this will not be had unless the latter offers his feedback in order to ratify, to correct and give directives, in some cases, so that the realizations are completed and fructified and, at others still, in order to prompt innovation and investment in domains that have remained so far beyond exploration. If then the quality of CORCAS, as an advisory body that poses no problems, its penchant for being the representative of all the Sahrawis could become somehow problematic to the extent where the term "Sahrawi" applies to both those who happen to be on Moroccan territory and those who can be found outside the State frontiers, be they in Tindouf, in Mauritania or in Spain. But doesn't the autonomy Project make them flow into the selfsame mold, precisely with a view to reconciling and rallying them together? B. the representation of all « sahrawis » in order to shun any exclusion of the « expatriate third» We understand by the "expatriate Third," the numerical proportion, commonly admitted and well-established, of the populations of the Sahara that are to be found outside the national territory, mainly those found in Tindouf and, if need be, those that have a home in Mauritania and in Spain. We hasten to say here that for CORCAS, this Third cannot be considered as an intruder, or an odd element in relation to the Sahawi social entity, for though CORCAS operates at the level of political positioning in total antipode to the ideas and ambitions propagated by the elements of the Polisario, it remains no less true that it shares with the latter blood ties because they are oftentimes parents and cousins. And for a good reason: Mohamed Abdelaziz, the Head of the Polisario that he is, his father, a Moroccan Sahrawi, still lives in Marrakechi, the city whence the term "Marrakchi" derives (a resident of Marrakech), and is given to this selfsame Abdelaziz! Normally, these family ties ought to contribute towards creating relations of confidence, which constitutes a fundamental element in situations such as these. It is for this that ever since its creation, CORCAS has not ceased in this regard to appeal to the sequestered of Tindouf, who make up the bulk of this Third, as well as to their heads. Better still, Khalihenna Ould Errachid, the President of CORCAS showed no hesitation in declaring in an interview that: « (...) we are ready to help our brother and parent, Mohamed Abdelaziz, Polisario leader, to assume the presidency of the authority of autonomy, and we are determined to act with our utmost force to realize this objective within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty (...)». Yet, he quite specified that this had to be done « through an election». Also, the will of CORCAS to present itself as the representative of all Sahrawis is one way to secure the support of all the socio-tribal components of the Sahara, the ultimate aim being to lead the latter to a general participation in as well as an integral involvement in the politico-administrative management of the future autonomous Region. Isn't this a sort of reconstituted melting-pot; nay even more, a reunion of the members of the same family or the same tribe or fraction of a tribe, that will bring in the Autonomy Statute, promote economic and social development, and secure a well-being and a family life that have been missing in the lives of a great number of the «expatriate Third»? In its new formula, more representative than that of the year 1981, because it comprises not only notables (chosen from among the Parliamentarians, the Presidents of Regional Councils, the Presidents of provincial Assemblies and the presidents of professional Chambers) as well as the Chioukhs of tribes, but also the representatives of civil society (notably Human rights militants), economic operators as well as Moroccan nationals abroad, to which one has to add the fact that the structure as a whole includes, in a non negligible proportion, women and the youth. These are then the ingredients that will be such as to secure this body a greater credibility which, coupled with a large independence (CORCAS depends solely on the King) will not fail to turn this Council into a quality interlocutor at the international plane. It could thus present and defend the Moroccan Autonomy Project, convince the members of the international Community, still undecided or misinformed as it is, and hence lead it to conducting a rereading of the Sahara dossier in light of the positive as well as favorable attitude of the UN Security Council, notably its Resolutions 1754, 1783 of the years 2007 and 1813 of the year 2008, all of which have qualified the Moroccan Proposal for an Autonomy Statute in the Sahara as « serious and credible». Hammad ZOUITNI
Professor at the faculty of law, Fez
|
