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The contribution to a peaceful settlement of the question of the Moroccan Sahara has been, among other, behind the creation of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS). The Polisario Front has always presented itself as the unique representative of the Sahrawi population. Yet, the creation of CORCAS allows for a clearer understanding of this question, essentially vis-à-vis national and international public opinion wherein the propaganda led by the enemies of the territorial integrity of Morocco has for a long time now harbored this thesis, the refutation of which passes through the examination of the doubly representative character of CORCAS (I). Besides, following the recovery by Morocco of its Sahrawi provinces, the conflict, initially armed with the separatists of the Polisario, took a new turn ever since the cease-fire that was put in place on 6 September 1991, and above all beginning with the proposal of the statute of autonomy initiated by Morocco, towards a peaceful settlement. A major objective behind this settlement has been the return to the mother-land of the Sahrwai populations that are sequestered in Algerian territory, a situation that presupposes a massive, planned as well as ordered return (II). I. corcas, a doubly representative space The representativeness of the Polisario will be examined at two levels: that of Morocco's constitutional and political system, within the framework of which this body exercises its functions, and that of the native populations of the Sahrawi provinces. At these two levels, CORCAS has a doubly representative character: it is representative of both the Royal institution (A) and the Sahrawi population (B). A. corcas and the representativeness of the royal institution To look into the representativeness of the Royal institution by CORCAS necessitates a reminder of certain fundaments of the Moroccan constitutional and political regime. In fact, Morocco, as stated in the first Article of the Constitution of 1996, is a «Monarchy». Yet, in Morocco, the monarchy rests on certain fundaments that it imports to recall here in order to establish a clearer link between the Royal institution and CORCAS. 1. « imarat al-muminin » as a fundament of the moroccan monarchy If the first article of the Constitution defines Morocco as being a « democratic, social and constitutional Monarchy », Article 19 stipulates that the King is « Amir Al-Muminin » (the Commander of the Faithful). The origin of Imarat Al-Muminin (ed. the commandery of the faithful) dates back to the earliest times of Islam. The Prophet Mohammed was deputized by people who would fulfill the conditions of intellectual capacity, moral and material rectitude, and were accepted by the community of Muslims. This constituted a sort of «government» that was set up by the Prophet. Aboubakr held a place of privilege in such a government, so much so that he would receive delegation from the Prophet, notably in order to lead prayer. The companions of the Prophet deduced there-from that the Prophet conferred supreme delegation upon him, and it was in application of such goodwill that they designated him for succession. In order not to be qualified as the successor of the successor of the Prophet, Omar was named « Amir Al- Muminin ». Being a « Muslim State », (Preamble of the Constitution), and the King being the descendent of the Prophet, the institution of Imarat Al-Muminin, integrated as it is within the Moroccan constitutional order, confers upon the Sovereign several attributes which are principally listed in Article 19 of the Constitution. Hence, the King is «(...) the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups and organisations. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightfull boundaries». It is in light of these attributes of the Monarch that the representative character of CORCAS should be examined. 2. corcas as a body of the monarchical power Both the rationale and the overall orientation of the dahir relative CORCAS allow for relating this body to the Royal institution, which explains the representative character of the latter. In the rationale, to begin with, mention is made clear of the institution of Imarat Al-Muminin. There is also a mention of the ties of allegiance - or beîa -, an institution whose origins equally date back to the time of the Prophet, which ties the inhabitants of the Sahara with the Alaouite throne, the self-same ties of allegiance that the International Court of Justice makes mention of in its advisory opinion. Finally, the rationale describes CORCAS as a proposal force a well as an efficient institution in the emergence of the Sahrawi provinces, and the struggle for their Moroccanity, knowing that the King, in the terms of the Constitution itself, is the guarantor of the Kingdom's territorial integrity. It is; however, the articles that follow the rationale which allow for a better understanding of the representative character of the Royal institution, as attributed to CORCAS. 3. the royal prerogatives and corcas The dahir relative to the creation of CORCAS links this Council to the Royal institution by means of two principal mechanisms: the attributions of the Council and the nominations. a. the royal prerogative to turn corcas into a consultative body The character that CORCAS has for being a consultative body to the King emerges from its denomination itself (Royal Advisory Council for Saharan affairs). This character is reaffirmed by Article 1 of the dahir, which entrusts it with the mission of assisting His Majesty with all the affairs relative to the territorial integrity and national unity of the Kingdom, with the promotion and socio-economic development of the provinces of the South, as well as with the protection of their cultural identity. Article 2 of the dahir lists all the proper attributions that confer upon the Council the role of either a simple consultative organ, or that of a body in charge of a mission by the King. It is undeniable that CORCAS represents the Royal institution in the areas and domains of intervention fixed for it. b. the royal prérogative to nominate the members of corcas The president of CORCAS is nominated by the King (Article 3). The same applies to the members having a deliberative capacity, who are nominated for a four-year period from among the members of Parliament, the presidents of regional councils, the presidents of provincial assemblies, and presidents of professional chambers of the southern provinces during the fulfillment of their mandate. The Council also includes members who were elected for the former Council by their tribes, «Chioukhs» of tribes, members of associations belonging to civil society and youth organizations in the southern provinces, representatives of Moroccan natives of the southern provinces living abroad, representatives of the Tindouf sequestered populations, representatives of socio-economic operators and bodies, as well as a host of other personalities known for their lucidity and honesty (Article 4 of dahir). It is worth emphasizing that in addition to the fact of being nominated, the members listed by Article 4 are in their majority representatives of the local population; that is, elected members, which amply explains the representativeness of the Sahrawi populations, as well as the doubly representative character of CORCAS. B. corcas and the representativeness of the sahrawi populations Before examining the representativeness of the Sahrawi populations, it would be worthwhile to examine the ostensible representativeness claimed by the Polisario. 1. the decomposition of the polisario thesis as the « representative » of the sahrawi population In its attempt to erect itself as a national liberation movement, the Polisario has, for quite a long time now, striven to make itself go for the unique representative of a so-called Sahrawi people, and it is for a long time now also that the Moroccan authorities have not been able to lift the veil on such a pretension. Today still, for evident political considerations that aim to pave the way to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the Manhasset negotiations are entered into with the representatives of the Polisario. The reality has it otherwise, though; in the eyes of the institution of CORCAS, for other movements to surface up, either within or outside the Polisario, contributes to the falling apart of the thesis of the unique representative of the Sahrawi population. Several arguments can be adduced here that would yield a better understanding of the representativeness of the Polisario. a. the percentage of the populations sequestered in tindouf of which the polisario claims representativeness, and that of the populations living in the provinces of the south The direct negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Sahara conflict have been the logical outcome of the failure accompanying the organization of a referendum, which was proposed and accepted by Morocco, and was due to take place in 1991, a failure due to the fact that the electoral basis could not be concretely and objectively established, notably because of the obstructionist maneuvers of the Polisario itself. Today, the Polisario and Algeria refuse the census of the populations in the camps of Tindouf (Algeria), even for humanitarian reasons, and even more so, for such competent international bodies as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is estimated; however, that the number of these populations amounts to 90.000, contrary to the number of 165 000 quoted by the Polisario, not to mention the fact that among the 90 000 there figure populations that are not natives of the Sahara, populations that, within the general context underpinning the beginning of the conflict, were regrouped in the camps of Tindouf in order to blow the figure into bigger proportions, and by the same gesture, exert pressure on Morocco. Were one to make abstraction of these facts, and even go as far as considering that the Polisario really represents the will of all these populations - which is far from being the established truth -, one would in no way ignore the number of populations in the provinces of the South. Contrary to the opacity surrounding the number of sequestered in Tindouf, there exist in Morocco reliable statistics concerning the populations of Sahrawi origin living in the provinces of the South. These are estimated to total, according to some sources, 223.000. As can be observed, the difference is significantly big. Yet, a better appreciation of the representativeness in question would not be any closer to objectivity if it was not corroborated by other arguments, among which is the consideration of the aspirations of the sequestered populations themselves. b. the emergence of movements opposed to the polisario In camps set up on foreign territory, kept up by military force, and where the sequestered populations that are subject to propaganda and indoctrination barely eke out a living, it is not easy to see the emergence of dissident movements that are hostile to the line of conduct traced by the Polisario. Movements such as these have; nonetheless, seen the light of day. Such is the example of the so-called «Khat Achahid» movement which claims a part of the representativeness of the Sahrawi populations, and calls upon the United Nations to enter into negotiations with it. The movement, it is worth noting, emerged from within the ranks of the Polisario itself. It however denounces the latter's corrupt Direction, considers the 12th congress in Tifariti held by the Polisario in December 2007 to be utterly illegitimate, and estimates that the Direction of the Polisario has absolutely no right to negotiate with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawi population (communiqué published on 24 December 2007). «Gjijimat» is such another movement. Upwards of a thousand persons held a congress in parallel with the 12th congress of the Polisario in Tifariti, and declared therein that they were favorable to the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco, when they had for a long time remained in favor of the independence of the Sahara. Other movements exist that are in favor of the autonomy plan, but these often act within the framework of associations. It would then be legitimate to inquire about the legitimacy of this supposedly «exclusive and unique representativeness» of the Polisario, all the more because defections among the ranks of this movement have been registered for a long time now. c. defections in the ranks of the polisario A great number of political operators who act on the national and international scene within the framework of the Sahara affair, had occupied first-rank positions within the Direction of the Polisario, but rejoined the mother-land. This was equally the case of many a sequestered Sahrawi. Some non-official figures estimate the number of the returnees to stand at between 6.000 and 7.000, all of whom could rejoin the mother land and to integrate the social, political and economic life of the country. Amply illustrative of this is the strong participation recorded among Sahrawis in the last legislative elections. d. the strong participation of the sahrawi populations in the last legislative elections The legislative elections of 07 September 2007 had one of the lowest rates of participation ever. And despite some criticism, these elections were judged by independent observers to be credible. The revelation of these elections; however, has been the high rates of participation recorded in the provinces of the South, rates which went by far beyond those recorded in the other provinces. Indeed, of all the readings possible, the one that allows not for even a modicum of doubt has to do with the attachment of the populations of these provinces to the political system of their country, far from the fallacious theses of the Polisario. Being as they are numerically, that is, the most important, the examination of the question of the representativeness of these populations could not be carried out with reference to the Polisario, but in connection with another body; namely - CORCAS -. 2. the representativeness of the sahrawi populations by corcas Two aspects of this kind of representativeness will hold our attention: an aspect relative to its composite as well as diversified nature, and another one of a symbolic order. a. the diversified nature of the representativeness of corcas The composite nature of the Council manifests itself at several levels: At the level of the members composing it: the Council is indeed composed of members, all of whom are Sahrawis, and many of whom have already acquired some representativeness through some mode of election, on the one hand, and other members directly nominated by the King, on the other. At the level of the attributed role; the Council is composed of members who enjoy a deliberative authority, as well as members who sit on in advisory capacity. At the level of the represented target populations; the Council integrates national, regional, provincial and local elected representatives, as well as persons who belong to diverse socio-economic horizons; or to associations, etc. The Council is also characterized by a horizontal integration of all the components - or almost-of the Sahrawi population. Among these members, the Council totals 10% of females and 15% of young males.
Equally important is the fact that the Council also integrates some ex-leaders of the Polisario, the members who were elected for the former council by their tribes, the chioukhs (ed. public notables) of tribes, the representatives of Moroccan natives of the southern provinces living abroad, as well as the representatives of the Tindouf sequestered populations (Article 4 of the dahir relative to (CORCAS). b. the symbolic character of the representativeness Some consider that only the direct election of the members of the Council by the Sahrawi populations would constitute a real gauge for representativeness; thinking in this way would imply an ignorance of the nature of the Moroccan political and constitutional regime, as well as of Morocco's internal juridical order. In fact, whatever their quality (parliamentarians, socio-economic operators, etc.), all the members of the Council are nominated by the King, which translates the ties of allegiance that unite, through representatives, the populations of the Sahrawi provinces to the Alaouite throne. Besides, the nature of the representativeness of CORCAS, which serves as interface between the central power and the populations of the Sahrawi provinces, constitutes a space of accommodation of and assistance with integration and reconciliation in these provinces. II. corcas, a space of accommodation and assistance for integration and reconciliation Among the attributions of CORCAS, Article 2 of the dahir governing CORCAS provides for that of putting forward proposals concerning whatever measures leading to the return and integration of all the Moroccans who come from the provinces of the South to the clement and merciful motherland. The article also stipulates that His Majesty could put the Council in charge of any mission in connection with the affairs listed in the self-same article, be they general or specific. The scope of these affairs is sufficiently large to include assistance with return and integration. Thus, how could CORCAS in fact constitute, within a spirit of reconciliation, a space of assistance with and towards the return and integration of the native populations of the provinces of the South to their motherland? A. corcas and assistance with the return, the settlement and integration of the sahrawi populations The illegal confinement of the populations in the camps of Tindouf cannot and will not last forever; the return of these populations to the motherland is only a matter of time. Therefore, some concrete actions have to be taken and carefully prepared by CORCAS. 1. corcas and assistance with the return The terms of the last conclusions presented by M. Peter Van Walsum, the former personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Sahara, before the Security Council on 21 April 2008, were crystal clear: the option of independence is not realistic. M. Peter Van Walsum has been supported in his realistic vision by the Security Council in Resolution 1813, which was unanimously adopted by the 15 members on 30 April 2008. In this resolution, the Council ratifies, all reservations aside, the call for «realism» and the «spirit of compromise» launched by M. Van Walsum. Another established advantage of Resolution 1813 is the exceptional protraction by one year of the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) mandate, previously of six months only, with a view to bringing the negotiations to fruition. However, should the other parties persist in their determination to maintain the status quo, would it then be still admissible that the populations sequestered in Tindouf continue to be penalized for and shoulder the consequences of a conflict that has dragged on for thirty years now, when they could live freely and decently in their land of origin? CORCAS would have to play a role in remedying to this situation. It would do so by establishing contact with the sequestered populations as well as by organizing their return. a. keeping contact with the sequestered populations Both CORCAS and its president, M. Khalli Henna Ould Errachid, never cease to multiply calls in the destination of the Polisario, inviting it over to reconciliation. The calls; however, are not always heard, and CORCAS does then everything possible to establish direct links with the sequestered populations, with a view to making them more confident, as well as empowering them into standing up against risks and coming back home to where they belong. Indeed, ever since the dawn of the conflict, a growing number of Sahrawis came back to Morocco, individually or in small groups. In yet a recent evolution, their comeback started to take a more massive aspect. The role played by CORCAS has been crucial in this evolution, because the contacts established have led to the return of a group of 100 persons from «Gjijimat», following the 12th congress held by the Polisario. The multiplication of these contacts, as well as the diversification of their channels of operation, ought to constitute the primary types of actions to be undertaken by CORCAS, and the same goes for the organization of the return process. b. the organization of the return The organization of the return by CORCAS is conceivable under two scenarios: one optimist, the other pessimist. The optimist scenario is that of the soon-to-come success of the negotiations led by Morocco under the auspices of the United Nations on the implementation of the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco; the organization of the return of the populations would then take an official form, and would certainly be examined within the framework of negotiations, as delicate and important as this form is. We have no precise data on hand, but it is a well-known fact that the populations living in the camps of Tindouf are not all natives of the provinces of the South. Would it be necessary to organize the return of all these populations? How many would they be? Under this scenario, CORCAS would be able to play a certainly important role, albeit a subsidiary one, in organizing the return of the populations. On the Moroccan side, the negotiations were led by the Moroccan authorities, and it is these very authorities which would administer their return, with CORCAS acting in advisory capacity over several aspects of the organization of this return. The role of CORCAS would be all the more subsidiary, as point 32 of the Autonomy Statute stipulates, in the case of negotiations, and «once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections». The pessimist scenario is, in the current state of things, unfortunately the most probable one. In the face of the support given to the Moroccan autonomy proposal, the Polisario finds no other means but to scupper and drive it all to ruin, asking to keep M. Peter Van Walsum away by refusing to pursue the negotiations in his presence, as well as by trying to establish a fait accompli in the Moroccan region of Tifariti, which is situated on the other side of the wall of defense. The Polisario, supported as it has been mainly be Algeria and South Africa, will push towards escalation - it even threatens from time to time to go back to arms -; or in the best possible cases, perpetuate the negotiations as long as possible, as the title of a national daily newspaper has come to put it. The newspaper in question simply reproduces a declaration by M. Peter Van Walsum to the Dutch daily «NCR Handelsblad» (24 May 2008 edition) wherein he expressed his feeling that he was somehow put in charge of the Sahara only to make it drag on ad infinitum. « Is it morally fair to accept that another generation of Polisario children grow up in the camps? », he wondered before suggesting that the Polisario «(...) enter into hard negotiations for a serious and guaranteed form of autonomy under Moroccan flag». Considering this situation, and being strong in terms of its representativeness, as well as its legitimacy, CORCAS has, on the contrary, to harness all the peaceful means susceptible of organizing the return of the sequestered. It would indeed be incumbent upon the Moroccan authorities to support it in this effort by all appropriate means available. In either scenario, CORCAS would have to assume yet another task, important as much as arduous, too-that of assisting with settlement and integration. 2. corcas and assistance with settlement and integration As has already been mentioned, it is stipulated in the dahir of creation relative to CORCAS that this body assists the King, notably on the questions of promoting the social and economic development of the provinces of the South, as well as on the preservation of their cultural identity. In its communiqué at the close of the first ordinary session in the year 2008, this Council renewed its call for reconciliation, and announced the adoption of a set of important programs in the area of fishing, transportation, housing and employment, programs that it has implemented in perfect coordination with the government. Whether it is the case of a general return of the sequestered populations in Tindouf, as the result of negotiations, or a return resulting from procedures undertaken by CORCAS, such initiatives are of great importance in preparing the settlement of the returnees, first, and their integration, later. To examine these questions deserves some special attention, especially as this body has shown its limits on these planes. a. assistance with the settlement of the rejoined We could consider that the first administration of the settlement operation concerning the returnees has not been quite successful. The return to the mother land would formerly take place on an individual basis; or by groups at the most; in the first operation to have been negotiated and led by CORCAS towards the return of the so-called «Gjijimat» group (around 100 persons), the Council showed its limits. What would happen if some more numerically significant groups were to rejoin the country tomorrow? In fact, some media reported the refusal of a number of persons to have rejoined the homeland as part of the «Gjijimat» group of the offer made by CORCAS towards their rehousing within the framework of a housing project in Laâyoune. A number of them chose to say in the hotel where they were received upon their arrival, among whom there were entire families. We have no reasons for doubt as to the facts related by this source of information; they have indeed the advantage of urging this Council to take cognizance of all the efforts it should deploy in order to better administer this operation whose dimensions may be much more important. CORCAS must inescapably be equipped with a clearer strategy and sufficient enough means if it were to better organize the settlement of the returnees, as a prelude to their integration. b. assistance with the integration of the rejoined In his book on «Le Sahara, liens sociaux et enjeux stratégiques», Mohamed Cherkaoui devotes the second part entirely to the question of the social and economic integration of the Sahara. He delivered up the following in this sociological study: « I have sought and analyzed to this end all the demographic, economic and sociological data concerning the last four decades, and have used the most refined mathematical and statistical models in order to test the hypothesis of the relatively good integration of these populations. The findings of the study all go in the same direction-the emergence as well as reinforcement of a thick network of social and economic ties that integrate the Sahrawi provinces through delivering them from the state of utter destitution they had to suffer during colonization, and allowing them to accede to modernity thanks to a positive and efficient discrimination policy ». The same author continues: « For the theoretical and practical reasons that I have developed (...) I have also conducted an investigation on what is, in my vision, the best indicator of social integration: matrimonial exchange (...) in the space of forty years, the rate of endogamy went down from upwards of 97% to less than 60%. The quasi-total of mixed marriages took place between Sahrawis and Moroccans from other regions. I hasten to add that this finding would have been more important had I been able to lay hand on the marriage contracts of the Sahrawis that live in Moroccan regions other than the Sahara: among this population, the rate of marriage would attain, it appears, record levels (...) ». If marriage turns out to be one of several factors that favor the integration of the Sahrawi populations remaining in the provinces of the South or settled in the Northern provinces, the question of integration would have to be put differently in the case of these selfsame populations who live in sequestration in Tindouf. In this regard, Article 2 relative to CORCAS has not failed to highlight the prerogatives of this Council concerning the integration of these populations (as well as their return). As per this Article, the Council is entitled to make proposals to His Majesty the King with respect to this measure. However, on what grounds would CORCAS be able to make such proposals, especially on a subject that concerns the sequestered populations, ones around which reliable data are lacking, and to which access to information is nearly impossible? CORCAS would then not be able to make any serious proposals regarding whatever measures leading to the integration of these populations unless it conducted a multidisciplinary study. In this respect, competent international bodies ought to make the realization of such a study a possibility. They could notably do so by favoring access to information on these populations. And there would be no doubt that, after 16 years of armed conflict and 33 years of sequestration, some thorough preparation for integration would constitute a conditio sine qua non for reconciliation. B. corcas and assistance with reconciliation In the case of the Sahara conflict, reconciliation would take two forms: reconciliation with the mother land, and reconciliation with the populations remaining in the country. 1. assistance towards reconciliation with the mother land To begin with, point 3 of the text of the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute in the Sahara Region stipulates that this initiative « (...) brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation ». The call to the «clement and merciful country» which was launched years ago by the late King Hassan II is reiterated in the text of the dahir relative to CORCAS (Article 2). The call in question was heard by all those who rejoined the mother land, and none of them showed any sign of worry. The call; however, has to take up more concrete forms when addressing the illegally confined populations in Tindouf. To prepare the reconciliation of these populations with the motherland is one of the questions that CORCAS should look into. Of the measures that would favor this reconciliation, one finds the Autonomy Plan which is presented by Morocco, and which proposes general amnesty. A measure such as this ought to be normally taken within the framework of the general settlement of the conflict, but this does not preclude it from effectively implementing it before any settlement. It would in this case constitute another gauge of the goodwill and outstretching arm of Morocco, still another element that would perhaps favor the settlement of the conflict. However, not knowing the intentions of the opponents, nor of how they would respond to the outstretching arm, CORCAS has to prepare the legal text relative to amnesty in a most meticulous way. Here again is another task that the Council should devote itself to. 2. assistance with reconciliation between the sahrawi populations Should the law - as a necessary tool in the case of amnesty- constitute a means of favoring reconciliation between the populations that are sequestered in Tindouf and their motherland, it would be of no help in the case of reconciliation between the Sahrawi populations themselves. CORCAS would be called for to rally all the assets it has on hand in order to put in practice some appropriate mechanisms. It is a known fact that the tribal aspect will always remain deep-seated for the populations of the Sahara. Also, the stands of the ones and the others in connection with the Sahara conflict would constitute yet another ground for frictions and antagonisms. Some other factors could eventually come into play, and it is significant to mention, for example, that the return of the «Gjijimat» group, which was organized by CORCAS, was not favorably regarded by the returnees at the dawn of the 1990's, some of whom came out to claim the regularization of their material situation, as has been reported. Here also CORCAS ought to act proactively, to conduct a study that would pin down all the possible reasons behind the conflict, and come up with the appropriate answers. And here again, for CORCAS to conduct a multidisciplinary study turns out to be mandatory. Conclusion The question of the Sahara conflict could evolve in one of these two ways: To make common sense prevail, show evidence of realism and put an end to this conflict whose first victims are the sequestered populations. The way to settle this dispute has never been as strongly supported as the Moroccan proposal for autonomy has; To maintain the status quo; or in the worst scenarios, trigger off an escalation. In this configuration, the sequestered in Tindouf will not be the only ones to suffer; the whole region will.
In either eventuality, ought CORCAS to remain in a state of expectation? The answer will only be negative, and we have shown throughout the preceding analysis what this Council would represent, and what appropriate actions it would have to take. In the Sahara conflict, the role of Algeria - long glossed over - has become a well-known fact, even among the misinformed ones. The autonomy Statute proposed by Morocco, including everything it offers by way of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with international legality, and for what it constitutes in terms of being an asset for the whole Maghreb region, history reveals that back in 1988 this proposal was the selfsame solution proposed by Algeria itself, as transpires from the document classified «Top Secret» of the CIA, declassified recently. It is high time that Algeria started to recognize what is self-evident, and to admit that any settlement of the conflict will only be had within the framework of the autonomy proposed by Morocco. In the same vein, the international Community is called on to put pressure on Algeria in order to lead it into contributing more positively towards the settlement of the conflict; or at least, allow the sequestered to freely leave the camps of Tindouf, and let them make their own choice of their own destination. One would then speak of yet another «autonomy plan»-the right of the sequestered in Tindouf to self-determination. In a nutshell, CORCAS should be ready for all eventualities. Mohamed MELIANI
Dean of the faculty of juridical, economic and social sciences, Oujda
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